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Abstract. We study a continuous-time problem of public good contribution under uncer-
tainty for an economy with a finite number of agents. Each agent aims to maximize his expected
utility allocating his initial wealth over a given time period between private consumption and
repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock of some public good. We study the
corresponding social planner problem and the case of strategic interaction between the agents.
These problems are set up as stochastic control problems with both monotone and classical con-
trols representing the cumulative contribution into the public good and the consumption of the
private good, respectively. We characterize the optimal investment policies by a set of necessary
and sufficient stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions, which in turn allow to identify a universal sig-
nal process that triggers the public good investments. Further we show that our model exhibits
a dynamic free rider effect. We explicitly evaluate it in a symmetric Black-Scholes setting with
Cobb-Douglas utilities and we show that uncertainty and irreversibility of public good provisions
need not affect the degree of free-riding.
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1 Introduction
We study a general stochastic continuous-time problem of public good contribution under portfo-
lio constraints for an economy with a fixed number of agents. Each agent maximizes his expected
utility choosing how to allocate his initial wealth over a fixed time period [0, T ], T ∈ (0,∞],
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between private consumption and repeated but irreversible contributions to increase the stock
of some public good. Examples of public goods include clean environment, national security,
academic research and accessible public capital. In order to determine the (unique) efficient
allocation we first consider the corresponding social planner problem. As in other settings, our
analysis reveals that its solution cannot be obtained by strategic interaction between the agents
because of a classical free rider effect: agents enjoy the contributions of others but do not take
into account other’s benefits when making their own contributions (see, e.g., Cornes and Sandler
(1996) or Laffont (1988)).
In the economic literature there is a long tradition of research on public good contribution
and free rider problems started by the static analyses of Olson (1965) and Samuelson (1954),
and further developed by Bergstrom et al. (1986), Groves and Ledyard (1977) (in the context
of a general equilibrium model), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984a), Palfrey and Rosenthal (1984b),
Varian (1994), among others1. Free rider problems in continuous time are studied for instance
in the early papers Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) and Levhari and Mirman (1980); see also
the more recent Wirl (1996) and Wirl (2007). Irreversibility constraints on the public good
contribution are introduced in the literature on ‘monotone games’ by assuming that players’
individual actions can only increase over time. We refer to Lockwood and Thomas (2002),
Matthews (2011) and, more recently, to Battaglini et al. (2014), among others. Several papers
also considered public good provision problems under uncertainty. We refer to Austen-Smith
(1980), Gradstein et al. (1993), Sandler et al. (1987) and Eichberger and Kelsey (1999). Recently,
the originally deterministic setting of Fershtman and Nitzan (1991) has been extended by Ewald
and Wang (2010) including a diffusion term. Subgame consistent cooperative solutions for public
good provisions in a stochastic differential game framework are finally considered in Yeung and
Petrosyan (2013).
Our model differs from the existing related literature on public goods for two main aspects.
First of all, we consider a stochastic, dynamic model of intertemporal investment choice with
general concave utilities, not necessarily separable, which thus allow us to account for cross
effects between the public and the private good. To the best of our knowledge, this is a novelty
with respect to the classical models in which usually the investor has a quasilinear utility and can
choose how to divide a budget given in each period between instantaneous private consumption
and public good investment, such that only the stock of the public good allows intertemporal
transfers.
Secondly, we take into account irreversibility of the investments which together with un-
certainty typically induces reluctance to invest. We are able to analyze the interplay of this
dynamic effect with free riding. Interestingly it is not necessarily the case that uncertainty
and irreversibility of public good contributions aggravate the degree of free-riding. We indeed
explicitly evaluate the free rider effect in a symmetric Black-Scholes setting with Cobb-Douglas
utilities and we show that uncertainty and irreversibility of public good provisions do not affect
the degree of free-riding.
From the mathematical point of view our problem falls into the class of continuous-time,
optimal stochastic control problems with both monotone and classical control processes. The
monotone controls represent the cumulative contributions into the public good, whereas the
1Public good contribution with imperfect information about individual actions is considered in Marx and
Matthews (2000); a direct extension to a Bayesian setting of the model in Varian (1994) is addressed in Bag and
Roy (2011)
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instantaneous consumption of the private good is modeled through a classical nonnegative and
adapted control process. We analyze such an optimal control problem by a first order condition
approach that may be thought of as a stochastic, infinite-dimensional generalization of the
classical Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Our method does not require any Markovian or diffusive
hypothesis, and in this sense it represents a substitute in non-Markovian frameworks for the
Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equation. This approach is very powerful in solving general singular
control problems as it has been shown in a quite recent literature. We refer to Bank and Riedel
(2001), Bank and Riedel (2003) for an intertemporal utility maximization problem with Hindy,
Huang and Kreps preferences; to Bank (2005), Chiarolla and Ferrari (2014), Ferrari (2015) and
Riedel and Su (2011) for the irreversible investment problem of a monopolistic firm with both
limited and unlimited resources; to Chiarolla et al. (2013) for the social planner problem in a
market with N firms and limited resources; to Steg (2012) for a capital accumulation game.
We start analyzing the public good contribution problem by taking the point of view of a
fictitious social planner who aims to maximize the expected total welfare of the economy under
a social budget constraint. Assuming prices of the public good and of the private consumption
given by discounted exponential martingales, we prove existence and uniqueness of the social
planner’s optimal policy via a suitable application of Komlo´s’ classical theorem (cf. Komlo´s
(1967)) and a further generalization of it due to Kabanov (cf. Lemma 3.5 in Kabanov (1999);
see also the functional analytic version of Balder (1990)). The optimal investment strategy is
completely characterized by a set of necessary and sufficient stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions
which in turn lead to the identification of a universal signal process that triggers the public good
investments. Such a signal process is the unique solution of a backward stochastic equation in
the spirit of Bank and El Karoui (2004). We then consider strategic interaction between the
agents in our economy and we show that any Nash equilibrium is again the solution of a set
of first order conditions for optimality. We restrict our attention to equilibria with open-loop
strategies (see also Back and Paulsen (2009) and Steg (2012)) in which agents do react to
the evolving exogenous uncertainty, take the contribution processes of others as given and do
not react to deviations from announced (equilibrium) play. Indeed, as pointed out in Back and
Paulsen (2009) there are serious conceptual problems defining a stochastic continuous-time game
of singular controls as ours with more explicit feedback (closed loop) strategies. Our approach
allows also to provide explicit results in a symmetric homogeneous setting where prices are
driven by Le´vy uncertainty. We find the explicit forms of the social planner’s optimal policy
and of the Nash equilibrium which enable a detailed analysis of the degree of free riding in our
model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we set up the model. In Section 3 we consider
the social planner problem, proving existence and uniqueness of its solution and introducing
the stochastic Kuhn-Tucker conditions for optimality. The public good contribution game is
addressed in Section 4, whereas explicit results are obtained in Section 5. Finally we refer to
Appendix A for some technical proofs.
2 The Model
We consider a continuous-time stochastic economy with a finite number n of agents over a fixed
time horizon 0 < T ≤ ∞. Each agent, indexed by i = 1, . . . , n, chooses how to allocate his initial
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wealth wi > 0 between private consumption xi and arbitrary but nondecreasing cumulative
contributions Ci to increase the stock of some public good. We assume a continuous revelation
of information about an exogenous source of uncertainty and we allow the agents to condition
their decisions on the accumulated information. Formally, let (Ω,F , {Ft}t∈[0,T ], P ) be a filtered
probability space satisfying the usual conditions of right-continuity and completeness. For the
moment we do not make any Markovian assumption.
One may think that the agents are financed entirely by their labour or by holding a portfolio
of financial instruments. Hence they are part of a more complex financial market that, however,
we do not model explicitly. At initial time each agent can buy one unit of the private good for
contingent delivery at time t ∈ [0, T ] and state ω ∈ Ω at forward price ψx(ω, t). Analogously,
the contingent state-price for the contribution to the public good is ψc(ω, t). Both ψx and ψc
are strictly positive (more technical conditions are listed in Assumption 2 below). The forward
price of an investment plan (xi, Ci) is therefore
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
,
where (xi, Ci) can be chosen in the nonempty, convex budget-feasible set
Bwi :=
{
(xi, Ci) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2+ adapted, s.t. Ci is right-continuous, nondecreasing,
Ci(0−) = 0 P -a.s., and E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
≤ wi
}
.
(2.1)
Here E[
∫ T
0 ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dC
i(t)] ≤ wi defines therefore the budget constraint of agent i.
Notice that we can have jumps as well as singular increases in Ci. This allows for contributions
into the public good in bulks, as well as in a singular way. Clearly, the contributions in rates are
allowed for as well. Recalling that each t 7→ Ci(ω, t) is a.s. nondecreasing, from now on we will
denote by
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dC
i(t) the Lebesgue-Stiltjes integral
∫
[0,T ] ψc(t)dC
i(t), to include a possible
initial contribution’s bulk.
The agents are assumed to derive some expected, time-separable utility from the private good
and the aggregate public good process C :=
∑
i∈{1,...,n}C
i. Given a combination of strategies
from
∏n
i=1 Bwi , agent i’s utility is
U i(xi, Ci;C−i) := E
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsui(xi(t), C(t)) dt
]
, (2.2)
where C−i :=
∑
j∈{1,...,n}\iC
j , r is an exogenous stochastic discount factor and the random
fields ui : Ω × R+ × R+ 7→ R+ describe instantaneous utilities. In the economic literature on
public good contribution it is customary to assume quasilinear utilities (see, e.g., the early paper
by Varian (1994) and the very recent by Battaglini et al. (2014)). Here, instead, we work with
general concave utilities, allowing to account for cross effects between the public and the private
good.
Assumption 1.
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i. For any ω ∈ Ω, the mapping (x, c) 7→ ui(ω, x, c) is increasing and strictly concave on R2+,
as well as twice continuously differentiable on the open cone R2++. Moreover, it satisfies
the Inada conditions
lim
x↓0
uix(ω, x, c) = +∞ and lim
x↑∞
uix(ω, x, c) = 0
for any ω ∈ Ω and c > 0.
ii. For any given (x,C) ∈∏ni=1 Bwi, the process (ω, t) 7→ ui(ω, x(ω, t), C(ω, t)) is progressively
measurable.
iii. The family
(
e−
∫ t
0 r(ω,s) dsui(ω, x(ω, t), C(ω, t)), (x,C) ∈
n∏
i=1
Bwi
)
is P ⊗ dt-uniformly in-
tegrable.
From now on, to simplify exposition, we will suppress the dependence on ω in the random utility
functions of the agents and in all the stochastic processes. Moreover, we make the next standing
assumption.
Assumption 2.
i. The optional process ψc := {ψc(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is of class (D), lower semicontinuous in ex-
pectation2 and such that ψc(t) := e
− ∫ t0 rc(s)dsEc(t), for some continuous, uniformly bounded
and (strictly) positive process rc := {rc(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}, and for some exponential martingale
Ec := {Ec(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}. Moreover, if T =∞, one has ψc(T ) = 0 a.s.
ii. The optional process ψx := {ψx(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is such that ψx(t) := e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsEx(t) for
some continuous, uniformly bounded and (strictly) positive process rx := {rx(t), t ∈ [0, T ]},
and for some exponential martingale Ex := {Ex(t), t ∈ [0, T ]}. Moreover, if T = ∞, one
has ψx(T ) = 0 a.s.
iii. The optional (strictly) positive continuous process r := {r(t), t ∈ [0, T ]} is uniformly
bounded.
Under Assumptions 1 and 2 the payoff in (2.2) is well defined and finite for any i = 1, . . . , n.
Remark 2.1.
i. The Inada conditions of Assumption 1.i. guarantee that there will be an interior solution
for optimal private consumption.
2A stochastic process X is:
(a) optional if it is measurable with respect to the optional sigma-field O on Ω× [0, T ] generated, e.g., by the
right-continuous adapted processes;
(b) of class (D) if {X(τ), τ stopping time} defines a uniformly integrable family of random variables on
(Ω,F , P ).
(c) lower-semicontinuous in expectation if for any stopping time τ one has lim infn↑∞E[X(τn)] ≥ E[X(τ)],
whenever {τn}n∈N is a sequence of monotone stopping times converging to τ .
We refer the reader to Dellacherie and Meyer (1978), among others, for further details.
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ii. Note that since ui is concave in c, by Assumption 1.iii. e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsuic(x(t), C(t)) is P ⊗ dt-
integrable for any (x,C) ∈∏ni=1 Bwi such that C(0) > 0 a.s.
iii. Thanks to the budget constraint (cf. (2.1)), when T < ∞ one can easily adapt the argu-
ments in the proof of Lemma 2.1 in Bank and Riedel (2001) to show that Assumption 1.iii.
is satisfied if
(a) for some α, β ∈ (0, 1) one has
ui(ω, x, c) ≤ const.(1 + xα + cβ), for all x, c ≥ 0 uniformly in ω ∈ Ω;
(b)
E−1x ∈ Lpˆ(P ), and E−1c ∈ Lqˆ(P ),
for some pˆ > α1−α and qˆ >
β
1−β , and with Ex and Ec as in Assumption 2.
iv. It is easy to see that Assumption 2.i. and 2.ii. are satisfied, for example, by the classical
benchmark cases of geometric Brownian motions (for discount factors rc and rx suitably
chosen to have ψc(T ) = 0 = ψx(T ) a.s. when T = +∞).
3 The Social Planner Problem
We start our analysis by studying a social planner problem for the economy described in Section
2. Throughout this section, denote by (x,C) a vector of investment processes valued in R2n+ with
components (x1, . . . , xn, C1, . . . , Cn) and introduce the nonempty, convex, social budget-feasible
set
Bw :=
{
(x,C) : Ω× [0, T ] 7→ R2n+ adapted s.t. Ci is right-continuous, nondecreasing,
Ci(0−) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n, P -a.s. and
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
≤ w
}
with w :=
∑n
i=1w
i. We say that (x,C) is admissible if (x,C) ∈ Bw. Suppose that there
exists a fictitious social planner aiming to maximize the aggregate expected utility by allocating
efficiently the available initial wealth. This amounts to solving the optimization problem with
value function
VSP := sup
(x,C)∈Bw
USP (x,C) = sup
(x,C)∈Bw
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi, Ci;C−i) (3.1)
with U i(xi, Ci;C−i) as in (2.2) and for positive weights γi, i = 1, . . . , n, such that
∑n
i=1 γ
i = 1.
Theorem 3.1. Under Assumptions 1 and 2 there exists (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw which solves the social
planner problem (3.1) and which is unique up to indistinguishability.
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Proof. The proof is organized in three steps.
Step 1. In this first step we let T < ∞. Recall that ψx(t) = e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsEx(t) and ψc(t) =
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsEc(t), for some continuous and uniformly bounded processes rx and rc, and for some
exponential martingales Ex and Ec (cf. Assumption 2.i.). Let E˜c[·] and E˜x[·] be the expectations
under the measures P˜c and P˜x with Radon-Nikodym derivative Ec(T ) and Ex(T ), respectively,
with respect to P . Since Ex(T ) > 0 and Ec(T ) > 0 a.s., the measure P is equivalent both to
P˜c and P˜x. Denote by VT the space of all optional random measures on [0, T ] endowed with
the weak-topology in the probabilistic sense3, by L1(dµx) the space of all functions integrable
with respect to the measure dµx := dP˜x ⊗ dt and set x :=
∑n
i=1 x
i. Then Bw ⊂ L1(dµx)n ⊗ VnT .
Indeed, for any i = 1, . . . , n, and for some constant K1 > 0
w ≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsE[Ex(T )|Ft]xi(t)dt
]
= E
[
Ex(T )
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsxi(t)dt
]
≥ K1E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
xi(t)dt
]
, (3.2)
where Girsanov’s Theorem and the uniform boundedness of rx imply the last step. Also, each
component of C is the cumulative distribution of an optional random measure, being an adapted,
right-continuous, nonnegative process.
Let now {(xm, Cm)}m∈N ⊂ Bw be a maximizing sequence; that is, a sequence of investment
plans such that
lim
m→∞
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xim, C
i
m;C
−i
m ) = VSP .
The two sequences {E˜x[
∫ T
0 x
i
m(t)dt]}m∈N and {E˜c[Cim(T )]}m∈N are uniformly bounded in m for
every i = 1, . . . , n, because of (3.2) and since, analogously,
w ≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i(t)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsE[Ec(T )|Ft] dCi(t)
]
= E
[
Ec(T )
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsdCi(t)
]
= E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsdCi(t)
]
≥ K2E˜c[Ci(T )],
where the second equality follows from Theorem 1.33 in Jacod (1979), and with K2 > 0 a
suitable constant by the uniform boundedness of rc. Hence by Komlo´s’ theorem (see Komlo´s
(1967) for its standard formulation and Kabanov (1999), Lemma 3.5, for a version of Komlo´s’
theorem for optional random measures), for every i = 1, . . . , n there exist two subsequences
{x˜im}m∈N ⊂ {xim}m∈N and {C˜im}m∈N ⊂ {Cim}m∈N and a dµx-integrable and adapted process xi∗
and some optional random measure dCi∗, i = 1, . . . , n such that as k ↑ ∞
Xik(t) :=
1
k + 1
k∑
m=0
x˜im → xi∗(t), dµx-a.e. (3.3)
3An optional random measure on [0, T ] is simply a random variable ν valued in the space of positive finite
measures on [0, T ] (endowed with the topology of weak*-convergence) such that the process ν(ω, t) := ν(ω, [0, t])
is adapted.
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and
Iik(t) :=
1
k + 1
k∑
m=0
C˜im → Ci∗(t), P˜c-a.s., for every point of continuity of Ci∗(·) and t = T.
(3.4)
From now on, with a slight abuse of notation, we will denote by Ci∗ as well the right-continuous
modification of Ci∗. Notice that having limk→∞ Iik(t) = C
i∗(t) P˜c-a.s. for every point of continuity
of Ci∗(·) and for t = T (cf. (3.4)) means that the sequence of measures on [0, T ] dIik(ω, ·) converges
weakly to dCi∗(ω, ·) P˜c-a.e. ω; that is (see, e.g., Billingsley (1986))
lim
k→∞
∫ T
0
f(t)dIik(t) =
∫ T
0
f(t)dCi∗(t), P˜c − a.s., (3.5)
for every continuous and bounded function f . We now claim that the Komlo´s’ limit (x∗, C∗) :=
(x1∗, . . . , xn∗ , C1∗ , . . . , Cn∗ ) belongs to Bw and that it is optimal for the social planner’s problem
(3.1). Indeed, (Xk, Ik) := (X
1
k , . . . , X
n
k , I
1
k , . . . , I
n
k ) ∈ Bw by convexity of Bw, and (3.3), (3.5)
and Fatou’s Lemma imply
w ≥ lim inf
k→∞
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)X
i
k(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dI
i
k(t)
]
= lim inf
k→∞
n∑
i=1
(
E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsXik(t)dt
]
+ E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsdIik(t)
])
(3.6)
≥
n∑
i=1
(
E˜x
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rx(s)dsxi∗(t)dt
]
+ E˜c
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 rc(s)dsdCi∗(t)
])
=
n∑
i=1
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x
i
∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC
i
∗(t)
]
;
that is, (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw. Recall now that Px ∼ P and Pc ∼ P . Then (3.4) and (3.3) also hold
P -a.s. and dP ⊗ dt-a.e., respectively, and therefore we may write
n∑
i=1
γiU i(xi∗, C
i
∗;C
−i
∗ ) ≥ lim
k→∞
n∑
i=1
γiU i(Xik, I
i
k; I
−i
k ) = VSP
by the uniform integrability assumed in Assumption 1.iii. and because (Xk, Ik) is also a maxi-
mizing sequence by concavity of each U i. Hence (x∗, C∗) is optimal.
Step 2. The above arguments also extend to the infinite horizon case T = +∞. We only
sketch the proof, since some of the arguments are similar to those employed in Step 1.
Let T = +∞ and {(xm, Cm)}m∈N be an admissible maximizing sequence for VSP . For each
K ∈ N we can apply the construction of Step 1 to the interval [0,K] to obtain measures P˜Kx and
P˜Kc equivalent to P on FK and limit processes x
K,i
∗ and optional random measures dC
K,i
∗ such
that the convergence (3.3) resp. (3.4) holds on [0,K]. As the convergence occurs also dP ⊗ dt
a.e., resp. P -a.s., we can aggregate the limits {xK,i∗ }K∈N and {dCK,i∗ }K∈N consistently to adapted
processes xi∗ and optional measures dCi∗ while maintaining convergence. Now we can apply the
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budget estimate (3.6) on each [0,K], let K → ∞ and conclude by monotone convergence that
(x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw. Optimality obtains exactly as in Step 1.
Step 3. Finally, uniqueness of (x∗, C∗) up to indistinguishability follows as usual (both in
the finite and in the infinite time-horizon case) from strict concavity of the utility functions ui,
i = 1, . . . , n and from convexity of Bw.
We now aim to characterize the social planner’s optimal policy by means of a set of first
order conditions for optimality. These conditions may be thought of as a stochastic, infinite
dimensional generalization of the classical Kuhn-Tucker method and they have been used in
various instances to solve singular stochastic control problems of the monotone follower type
modeling irreversible investment problems or consumption problems with Hindy-Huang-Kreps
preferences (see Bank (2005), Bank and Riedel (2001), Chiarolla et al. (2013), Chiarolla and
Ferrari (2014), Ferrari (2015), Riedel and Su (2011) and Steg (2012), among others).
For any (x,C) ∈ Bw and for some Lagrange multiplier λ > 0, define the Lagrangian functional
of problem (3.1) as
Lw(x,C;λ) :=
n∑
i=1
γiE
[∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsui(xi(t), C(t)) dt
]
+ λ
{
w − E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC(t)
]}
,
where again x :=
∑n
i=1 x
i and C :=
∑n
i=1C
i. Moreover, let T be the set of all (Ft)-stopping
times with values in [0, T ] a.s. and denote by ∇cLw the Lagrangian functional’s supergradient
with respect to the aggregated public good’s contribution; that is, the unique optional process
such that
∇cLw(x,C;λ)(τ) := E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γi uic(x
i(t), C(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ]− λψc(τ)1{τ<T}
for any τ ∈ T . ∇cLw(x,C;λ)(τ) may be interpreted as the future marginal net expected utility
the social planner would have making an infinitesimal investment into the public good at time
τ ∈ T when the investment plan is (x,C) ∈ Bw and the Lagrange multiplier is λ.
On the other hand, an additional consumption of the private good xi affects marginal utility
only at those times at which consumption actually occurs, thus leading to
∇xLw(x,C;λ)(τ) := γie−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i(τ), C(τ))− λψx(τ), τ ∈ T .
Remark 3.2. Following Remark 3.1 in Bank and Riedel (2001), ∇cLw(x,C;λ) is the Riesz rep-
resentation of the Lagrangian gradient at C. More precisely, for any arbitrary but fixed λ > 0,
define ∇cLw(x,C;λ) as the optional projection of the product-measurable process
Φ(ω, t) :=
∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(ω,u) du
n∑
i=1
γi uic(ω, x
i(ω, s), C(ω, s)) ds− λψc(ω, t)1{t<T}
for ω ∈ Ω and t ∈ [0, T ]. Hence∇cLw(x,C;λ) is uniquely determined up to P -indistinguishability
and it holds
E
{ ∫ T
0
∇cLw(x,C;λ)dC(t)
}
= E
{ ∫ T
0
Φ(t)dC(t)
}
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for all admissible C (cf. Jacod (1979), Theorem 1.33).
Proposition 3.3. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. An admissible policy (x∗, C∗) is optimal for
the social planner’s problem (3.1) if and only if there exists a Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 such
that the following first order conditions hold true for any stopping time ∈ T
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC∗(t)
]
= w,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λψc(τ)1{τ<T}, P − a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λψc(t))dC∗(t)] = 0,
γie−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i
∗(τ), C∗(τ)) ≤ λψx(τ), P − a.s. with equality whenever xi∗(τ) > 0.
(3.7)
The proof of Proposition 3.3 is given in Appendix A, Section A.1. It generalizes that of
Theorem 3.2 in Bank and Riedel (2001), to the present setting of a multidimensional optimal
consumption problem with both classical and monotone controls and it is obtained suitably
adapting in the stochastic, infinite-dimensional setting the proof of the classical Kuhn-Tucker
conditions. Indeed, concavity of the utility functions ui, i = 1, . . . , n yields sufficiency, whereas
the proof of the necessity part is more delicate. One has indeed to linearize the original problem
(3.1) around its optimal solution (x∗, C∗) and then to show that (x∗, C∗) solves the linearized
problem as well. Finally, one must prove that any solution to the linearized problem (and
therefore (x∗, C∗) as well) satisfies some flat-off conditions as the third and the fourth ones of
(3.7).
Notice that because of the Inada conditions (cf. Assumption 1.i.) the fourth one of (3.7) is
binding at any τ ∈ T , i.e.
γie−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsuix(x
i
∗(τ), C∗(τ)) = λψx(τ), P − a.s.
Recalling that (x, c) 7→ ui(x, c) is strictly concave (see again Assumption 1), and denoting by
gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c), we may write for any τ ∈ T
xi∗(τ) = g
i
( λ
γi
e
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsψx(τ), C∗(τ)
)
, P − a.s. (3.8)
Then, by plugging (3.8) into (3.7) we obtain the equivalent formulation of the first order condi-
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tions for optimality
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC∗(t)
]
= w,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), C∗(t)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λψc(τ)1{τ<T}, P − a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ s
0 r(u)duψx(s), C∗(s)
)
ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λψc(t))dC∗(t)] = 0,
e−
∫ τ
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(τ), C∗(τ)) = λψx(τ), P − a.s.,
(3.9)
for any τ ∈ T and with hi(ψ, c) := uic(gi(ψ, c), c).
Although the first order conditions of Proposition 3.3 (or those in (3.9)) completely char-
acterize the optimal policy, they are not binding at all times and so they cannot be directly
used to determine C∗ and consequently x∗ by (3.8). As usual in the literature on stochastic
control problems with monotone controls (see, e.g., Chiarolla and Haussmann (1994), El Karoui
and Karatzas (1991), Karatzas (1981), Karatzas and Shreve (1984) as classical references), the
optimal policy consists of keeping the controlled process close to some barrier (which is the free
boundary of an associated optimal stopping problem in a Markovian setting) in a ‘minimal way’
(i.e. according to a Skorohod’s reflection principle). Here we derive the social planner’s opti-
mal investment into the public good C∗ in terms of the running supremum of an index process
representing the desirable value of investment or consumption the agents would like to have.
Mathematically, such an index process is the optional solution of a stochastic backward equa-
tion in the spirit of Bank-El Karoui (cf. Bank and El Karoui (2004), Theorem 1 and Theorem
3) and it may be represented in terms of the value functions of a family of standard optimal
stopping problems (see also Bank and Fo¨llmer (2003) for further details and applications).
Theorem 3.4. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and define for every i = 1, . . . , n gi(·, c) as the
inverse of uix(·, c), as well as hi(ψ, c) := uic(g(ψ, c), c) for any ψ, c > 0. Then the unique solution
of the social planner’s problem (3.1) is
C∗(t) =
∑n
i=1C
i∗(t) = (sup0≤u≤t l∗(u)) ∨ 0
xi∗(t) = gi
(
λ
γi
ψx(t), C∗(t)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n
(3.10)
for a suitable Lagrange multiplier λ > 0 and where the optional, upper right-continuous process
l∗ uniquely solves the stochastic backward equation
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T} (3.11)
for any stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ], P -a.s.
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Proof. Existence of a unique optional, upper right-continuous solution l∗ to (3.11) is shown in
Appendix A, Proposition A.2. To show optimality of (x∗(t), C∗(t)) as in (3.10) it then suffices to
verify that it is admissible and it satisfies the sufficient and necessary first order conditions (3.9).
By Theorem 33 in Chapter IV of Dellacherie and Meyer (1978), C∗ as in (3.10) is adapted since
l∗ is optional; also, it has right-continuous sample paths since l∗ is upper right-continuous. On
the other hand, xi∗, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, is adapted and positive, since gi is continuous and positive.
Moreover, for any τ ∈ T we have
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), ( sup
0≤u≤t
l∗(u)) ∨ 0
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T}, (3.12)
where the first inequality follows from the fact that c 7→ hi(ψ, c) is strictly decreasing, whereas
(3.11) implies the last equality. On the other hand, if τ ∈ T is a time of investment, i.e. such
that C∗(τ + ε) − C∗(τ) > 04 for any ε > 0, we have (sup0≤u≤t l∗(u)) ∨ 0 = supτ≤u≤t l∗(u) and
equality holds in (3.12). Therefore the second line of (3.9) is satisfied as well. The optimal
private good consumption xi∗ of (3.10) is then determined by means of (3.8).
Remark 3.5. The process l∗ may be found numerically by backward induction on a discretized
version of problem (3.11) (see Bank and Fo¨llmer (2003), Section 4). In some cases, when
T = +∞, (3.11) has a closed form solution as in the case of a Cobb-Douglas utility function
(see Section 5 below).
4 The Public Good Contribution Game
In Section 3 we have taken the point of view of a fictitious social planner aiming to efficiently
maximize the social welfare. Here we aim to study strategic interaction between the agents of
our economy.
Determining agent i’s optimal choice of a strategy against a given process C−i specifying
aggregate contributions by the opponents amounts to solving the stochastic control problem
with value function
V i(C−i) := sup
(xi,Ci)∈Bwi
U i(xi, Ci;C−i), i = 1, 2, . . . , n, (4.1)
where Bwi and U i are as in (2.1) and (2.2), respectively. The description of the game is completed
by the introduction of a standard Nash equilibrium concept.
Definition 4.1. (xˆ1, . . . , xˆn, Cˆ1, . . . , Cˆn) is a Nash equilibrium if for all i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, (xˆi, Cˆi) ∈
Bwi and U i(xˆi, Cˆi, Cˆ−i) = V i(Cˆ−i).
While this equilibrium notion does not limit the ability of any agent to optimize against
given strategies of the others, it does limit the extent of dynamic interaction that can take
4that is, a time of increase for C∗(ω, ·).
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place. Although agents do react to the evolving exogenous uncertainty, they take the contribu-
tion processes of others as given and do not react to deviations from announced (equilibrium)
play. Therefore, one might term such an equilibrium as one in precommitment strategies. Un-
fortunately there are serious conceptual difficulties in defining a related game with more explicit
feedback strategies as argued by Back and Paulsen (2009), which is why we consider simple
Nash equilibria here. Besides these conceptual problems, the choice of open-loop strategies can
be justified at the modeling stage if agents are not able to observe the opponents’ investments
in the public good.
As in the social planner’s case we shall first characterize solutions of the best reply problems
(4.1) by means of a stochastic Kuhn-Tucker approach. The next Proposition accomplishes this.
Its proof may be obtained by adopting arguments similar to those employed to prove Proposition
3.3, and therefore we omit its proof for the sake of brevity.
Proposition 4.2. Let Cˆ−i be given and Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then (xˆi, Cˆi) ∈ Bwi attains
V i(Cˆ−i) (cf. (4.1)) if and only if there exists a Lagrange multiplier λi > 0 such that for any
stopping time τ ∈ T the following first order conditions hold true
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
= wi,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsuic(xˆ
i(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λiψc(τ), P − a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) duuic(xˆ
i(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λiψc(t))dCˆi(t)] = 0,
e−
∫ τ
0 r(u) duuix(xˆ
i(τ), Cˆ(τ)) ≤ λiψx(τ), P − a.s. with equality whenever xˆi(τ) > 0.
(4.2)
Again, the Inada conditions (cf. Assumption 1.i.) imply that the fourth one of (4.2) is always
binding. Hence, we may equivalently rewrite (4.2) as
E
[ ∫ T
0
ψx(t)xˆ
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCˆ
i(t)
]
= wi,
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dshi(λie
∫ t
0 r(s) dsψx(t), Cˆ(t)) dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] ≤ λiψc(τ), P − a.s.,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) duhi(λie
∫ s
0 r(u) duψx(s), Cˆ(s)) ds
∣∣∣∣Ft]− λiψc(t))dCˆi(t)] = 0,
e−
∫ τ
0 r(u) duuix(xˆ
i(τ), Cˆ(τ)) = λiψx(τ), P − a.s.,
(4.3)
where again hi(ψ, c) := uic(g
i(ψ, c), c) with gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c).
A more explicit characterization of the Nash equilibrium in the spirit of that shown in
Theorem 3.4 for the social planner’s optimal policy seems difficult to obtain in the generality
of our public good contribution game. In fact the first order conditions in (4.3) are mutually
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interconnected and this leads to a daunting (infinite-dimensional) fixed point problem. However,
when all the agents have the same utility function and the same initial wealth, each player is left
with the same optimization problem (cf. (4.1)). In such a symmetric setting our approach enables
us to show that the Nash equilibrium is triggered again (as in the social planner problem) by a
single signal process `∗ which is uniquely determined through a stochastic backward equation.
That is claimed in the following theorem. Its proof can be obtained by employing arguments
completely similar to those used to prove Theorem 3.4 and therefore it is omitted.
Theorem 4.3. Let Assumption 2 hold and assume that all the agents have the same initial wealth
wi = w and the same utility function ui ≡ u, for some utility function u satifying Assumption 1
and some w > 0. Let g(·, c) denote the inverse of ux(·, c), as well as h(ψ, c) := uc(g(ψ, c), c) for
any ψ, c > 0. Then, for a suitable Lagrange multiplier λ > 0, the Nash equilibrium of the public
good contribution game (4.1) is given by
Ci∗(t) = (sup0≤u≤t `∗(u)) ∨ 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
xi∗(t) = g
(
λψx(t), C∗(t)
)
, i = 1, . . . , n,
(4.4)
where the optional, upper right-continuous process `∗ uniquely solves the stochastic backward
equation
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) dsh
(
λe
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), n sup
τ≤u≤t
`∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T} (4.5)
for any stopping time τ ∈ [0, T ], P -a.s.
5 Explicit Results and the Free Rider Effect
In this section we explicitly solve the backward equations (3.11) and (4.5) in a symmetric homo-
geneous setting so to find the social planner optimal policy and the Nash equilibrium strategy
for the public good contribution game (cf. Theorem 3.4 and Theorem 4.4). Our model has
utilities ui(x, c) = x
αcβ
α+β , i = 1, . . . , n, for some α, β ∈ (0, 1) such that α + β < 1, and prices
ψx(t) = e
−rtEx(t), ψc(t) = e−rtEc(t), for some exponential Le´vy processes5 Ec and Ex (including
the important special case of geometric Brownian motion) and a constant interest rate r > 0.
Moreover, wi = w for all i = 1, . . . , n. This setting will be kept throughout this section.
Remarkably, our approach will also enable us to study in Section 5.3 the role played by
uncertainty and irreversibility of public good contributions in the so called free rider effect.
5.1 Explicit Results for a Symmetric Economy with Cobb-Douglas Utility
Proposition 5.1. Assume γi = 1n for every i = 1, . . . , n and define the processes
γ(t) :=
1
A
[(α+ β
α
)
Ex(t) inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
, (5.1)
5We refer to Bertoin (1996), among others, for a detailed introduction to Le´vy processes.
Notice also that the martingale property of Assumption 2 is without loss of generality in this case, one just has
to correct r by the Le´vy exponents of Ex and Ec, respectively. In any case, the martingale property of Ex and Ec
is not needed in the proof of the following results.
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θ(t) := sup
0≤s≤t
(
E−
1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)
)
, (5.2)
and the constants
l0 :=
nw
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] (5.3)
and
A := E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du
]
(5.4)
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Then, if l0 and A are finite
6, the social planner’s optimal solution is such that
C∗(t) = l0θ(t) (5.5)
and
xi∗(t) =
1
n
l0γ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (5.6)
with
λ =
1
nα
A1−αlα+β−10 .
Proof. By Theorem 3.4 to find the social planner optimal policy it suffices to solve backward
equation (3.11).
Recall that hi(ψ, c) = uic(g
i(ψ, c), c), where gi(·, c) is the inverse of uix(·, c). For any λ > 0,
simple algebra leads to hi( λ
γi
ertψx(t), C(t)) = δ(nλEx(t))
α
α−1C
α+β−1
1−α (t) with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Set C∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l∗(s)∨0 for some progressively measurable process l∗ to be found and then
(3.11) becomes
E
[ ∫ ∞
τ
δe−rs(nλEx(s))
α
α−1
(
sup
τ≤u≤s
l∗(u)
)α+β−1
1−α
ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λe−rτEc(τ),
i.e.,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru(nλ)
α
α−1
Ex
α
α−1 (u+ τ)
Ec(τ) inf0≤s≤u
(
l∗
α+β−1
1−α (s+ τ)
)
du
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λ. (5.7)
Make now the ansatz l∗(t) := l0Ec
1−α
α+β−1 (t)Ex
α
α+β−1 (t) for some constant l0, and use independence
and stationarity of Le´vy increments to rewrite (5.7) as
1
n
α
1−α
l
α+β−1
1−α
0 E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
α
α−1
x (u− s)
)
du
]
= λ
1
1−α .
By setting A := E[
∫∞
0 δe
−ru inf0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du] (cf. (5.4)) and by solving the
previous equation for λ one easily obtains
λ :=
1
nα
A1−αlα+β−10 .
6Notice that l0 of (5.3) and A of (5.4) are finite under some further specifications on the discount factor as it
is shown in the proof of Proposition 5.4 in Section 5.3 below.
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On the other hand, xi∗(t) = [nλ
(
α+β
α
)
Ex(t)C−β∗ (t)]
1
α−1 by (3.8) and therefore
xi∗(t) = (nλ)
− 1
1−α
[(
α+ β
α
)
Ex(t)l−β0 inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
;
that is,
xi∗(t) =
1
n
l0γ(t) (5.8)
with γ(t) as in (5.1).
To determine l0 we make use of the budget constraint E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)x∗(t)dt+
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dC∗(t)] =
nw. In fact, recalling that x∗ :=
∑n
i=1 x
i∗, from (5.8) we find
l0E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= nw, (5.9)
since C∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t l∗(s) = l0 sup0≤s≤t(E
− 1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)) = l0θ(t) with θ(t) as in (5.2).
By solving (5.9) for l0 (5.3) follows.
Remark 5.2.
i. As usual in stochastic control problems of the monotone follower type (see, e.g., the seminal
paper by Karatzas and Shreve (1984)), the optimal aggregated public good level C∗(t) (cf.
(5.1) and (5.5)) is a singular process since it increases only on the boundary l∗, i.e. on a
set of zero Lebesgue measure.
ii. The form of the optimal social planner’s policy found in Proposition 5.1 exhibits a be-
haviour which is typical for a Cobb-Douglas utility function. Indeed the ratio x
i∗(t)
w is inde-
pendent of n, since x
i∗(t)
w = γ(t)(E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dθ(t)])
−1, whereas C∗(t) ∼ n
and λ ∼ n−(1−β).
5.2 Explicit Results for a Symmetric Game with Cobb-Douglas Utility
In this section we explicitly solve the best reply problems (4.1). The proof of the following
reasult employs arguments similar to those used for the proof of Proposition 5.1, and therefore
it is given in Appendix A, Section A.3, for the sake of completeness.
Proposition 5.3. Define the processes
γ(t) :=
1
A
[(α+ β
α
)
Ex(t) inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
, (5.10)
θ(t) := sup
0≤s≤t
(
E−
1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)
)
, (5.11)
and the constants
κ :=
w
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] (5.12)
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and
A := E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du
]
(5.13)
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
.
Then, if κ and A are finite7, the symmetric Nash equilibrium of game (4.1) is given by
Cˆi(t) =
κ
n
θ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (5.14)
xˆi(t) = κγ(t), i = 1, . . . , n, (5.15)
with
λi = A1−ακα+β−1, i = 1, . . . , n.
5.3 The Free Rider Effect
In economics, the free rider problem occurs when those who benefit from resources, goods,
or services do not pay for them, which results in either an under-provision of those goods or
services, or in an overuse or degradation of a common property resource. The free rider problem
is common among public goods, because of their non-excludability - once provided it is for
everybody - and non-rivalry - the consume of the good by an agent does not reduce the amount
available to others. We refer to Cornes and Sandler (1996) or Laffont (1988) for more details.
Thanks to the results obntained in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, we are now able to explicitly evaluate
the free rider effect for our symmetric economy with Cobb-Douglas utilities and Le´vy uncertainty.
Let xi∗ be the optimal private consumption in the social planner’s problem (cf. (5.6)), and let xˆi
denote the Nash equilibrium private consumption (cf. (5.15)). Then one has
xi∗(t) =
wγ(t)
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
≤ wγ(t)
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
] = xˆi(t),
with equality for n = 1. It follows that in a strategic context each agent spends more for the
private consumption than what would be suggested by the social planner. On the other hand,
we have κ ≤ l0 (with κ as in (5.12), l0 as in (5.3) and equality if n = 1) which implies that the
social planner’s optimal cumulative contribution into the public good (5.5) is bigger than the
corresponding Nash equilibrium counterpart (5.14). That is, our model shows a free rider effect.
The evaluation of the free rider effect can be made even more explicit in a Black-Scholes
setting and with the public good taken as a nume´raire.
Proposition 5.4. Let C∗ be the optimal aggregated public good contribution for the social
planner problem (cf. (5.5)) and let Cˆ denote its Nash-equilibrium value (cf. (5.14)). Assume
7In the proof of Proposition 5.4 it is shown that κ of (5.12) and A of (5.13) are finite if the discount factor r
is sufficiently big.
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ψc(t) = e
−rt and ψx(t) = e−rtEx(t) ≡ e−rt+σW (t), σ > 0, for a one-dimensional Brownian
motion W and for some r such that
√
2r > σα1−α−β
8. Then, for any n ≥ 1 one has
Cˆ(t)
C∗(t)
=
κ
l0
=
α+ β
nα+ β
≤ 1, (5.16)
where κ and l0 are as in (5.12) and (5.3), respectively.
Proof. From (5.5) and (5.14) it easily follows that
Cˆ(t)
C∗(t)
=
κ
l0
=
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdθ(t)
]
E
[
n
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+
∫ ∞
0
e−rtdθ(t)
]
=
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtθ(t)dt
]
E
[
n
∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtθ(t)dt
] , (5.17)
with γ(t) and θ(t) as in (5.10) and (5.11), respectively. Then, in order to obtain (5.16), we need
to evaluate
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
and E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
.
We have
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rtθ(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rt sup
0≤s≤t
E−
α
1−α−β
x (s) dt
]
=E
[
e
− σα
1−α−β inf0≤s≤τr W (s)
]
= E
[
e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤s≤τr (−W (s))
]
(5.18)
=
√
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
, (5.19)
where τr is an independent exponentially distributed random time and where the last equality
follows from sup0≤s≤τr(−W (s)) ∼ Exp(
√
2r) (cf., e.g., Bertoin (1996), Chapter VII). On the
other hand, recall γ as in (5.10) and exploit that W (t) − sup0≤u≤tW (u) is independent of
sup0≤u≤tW (u) (i.e. Excursion Theory for Le´vy processes) and that W (t)− sup0≤u≤tW (u) has
8Notice that the martingale property of Assumption 2 is without loss of generality in this case, one just has
to correct r by 1
2
σ2, i.e. by the Laplace exponents of σW (t)
t
.
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the same distribution as inf0≤u≤tW (u) (i.e. Duality Theorem) to find
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
re−rte−
σα
1−αW (t)e
− σαβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) inf0≤u≤tW (u)dt
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α (−W (τr))e
σαβ
(1−α)(1−α−β) sup0≤u≤τr (−W (u))
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α [W˜ (τr))−sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)]e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e
σα
1−α inf0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
E
[
e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
E
[
e−
σα
1−α sup0≤u≤τr W (u)
]
E
[
e
σα
1−α−β sup0≤u≤τr W˜ (u)
]
=
1
rA
(
α+ β
α
)− 1
1−α
[ √
2r√
2r + σα1−α
][ √
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
]
,
where we have defined the new Brownian motion W˜ := −W and where we have used once more
sup0≤s≤τr W (s) ∼ sup0≤s≤τr W˜ (s) ∼ Exp(
√
2r). Again, if τr is an independent exponentially
distributed random time one has
A = E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δ e−rt inf
0≤s≤t
E−
α
1−α
x (t− s) dt
]
=
δ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−α sup0≤s≤τr W (τr−s)
]
=
δ
r
E
[
e−
σα
1−α sup0≤s′≤τr W (s
′)
]
=
δ
r
[ √
2r√
2r + σα1−α
]
with δ := βα
(
α+β
α
)− 1
1−α
and because sup0≤s≤τr(−W (s)) ∼ Exp(
√
2r). Therefore
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtEx(t)γ(t)dt
]
=
α
β
[ √
2r√
2r − σα1−α−β
]
. (5.20)
Finally, by plugging (5.18) and (5.20) into (5.17), some simple algebra leads to (5.16).
We observe that the ratio Cˆ/C∗, the underprovision of the public good due to free-riding,
does not depend on σ, the volatility of the Brownian motion W . Thus, in our model
Corollary 5.5. The degree of free-riding does not depend on the level of uncertainty.
This seems to be in contrast to the finding of other different models from the economic
literature in which it is shown that uncertainty may have some effect on the free rider effect
(cf. Austen-Smith (1980), Eichberger and Kelsey (1999) and Ewald and Wang (2010), among
others). Moreover, we show that also irreversibility of public good provisions do not have any
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effect on free-riding. These two results represent the main economically interesting conclusions
of our paper.
We now evaluate the role that irreversibility of the public good contribution has in the free
rider effect. To do so we compare the ratio (5.16) with the analogous one we shall obtain
by assuming instead perfect reversibility of C; i.e., by assuming that each agent can adjust
contribution in the public good freely at every point of time.
Proposition 5.6. Assume perfect reversibility of the public good contribution. Denote by C?
the optimal aggregated public good contribution made by the social planner and by C˜ its Nash
equilibrium value. Then, under the same hypotheses of Proposition (5.4), one has
C˜(t)
C?(t)
=
α+ β
nα+ β
(5.21)
for any n ≥ 1.
Proof. Under perfect reversibility of the public good contribution, the optimal investment crite-
rion is to equate the marginal operating profit with the user cost of capital (see, e.g., Jorgenson
(1963)). Hence the first-order conditions for optimality in the social planner’s problem read
α
α+ β
(xi?)
α−1(t)Cβ? (t) = λ?nEx(t),
β
α+ β
(xi?)
α(t)Cβ−1? (t) = λ?r,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)
n∑
i=1
xi?(t) dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rtC?(t) dt
]
= nw,
(5.22)
whereas for the Nash equilibrium they are
α
α+ β
(x˜i)α−1(t)C˜β(t) = λ˜Ex(t),
β
α+ β
(x˜i)α(t)C˜β−1(t) = λ˜r,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)x˜
i(t) dt+ r
∫ ∞
0
e−rt
1
n
C˜(t) dt
]
= w.
(5.23)
By solving systems (5.22) and (5.23) one easily obtains
xi?(t) =
(
rα
β
)[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β
(nEx(t))−
(1−β)
1−α−β ,
C?(t) =
[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β
(nEx(t))−
α
1−α−β ,
λ
− 1
1−α−β
? =
nw
rn
− α
1−α−β
(
α+β
β
) [(
rα
β
)1−α (
α+β
α
) ]− 1
1−α−β
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
] ,
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and
x˜i(t) =
(
rα
β
)[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β E−
(1−β)
1−α−β
x (t),
C˜(t) =
[
λ?
(
α+ β
α
)(
rα
β
)1−α ]− 1
1−α−β E−
α
1−α−β
x (t),
λ˜
− 1
1−α−β =
nw
rn
− α
1−α−β
(
nα+β
nβ
) [(
rα
β
)1−α (
α+β
α
)− 1
1−α−β
]− 1
1−α−β
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
] ,
with E
[ ∫ ∞
0
e−rtE−
α
1−α−β
x (t) dt
]
<∞ since √2r > σα1−α−β . Then (5.21) easily follows.
Corollary 5.7. For any n ≥ 1 one has
Cˆ(t)
C∗(t)
=
C˜(t)
C?(t)
≤ 1.
That is, irreversibility of the public good contributions does not influence the degree of free-riding.
In conclusion, we have shown that in our model, for a symmetric economy with Cobb-Douglas
utilities, the degree of underprovision of the public good due to free-riding does not depend on
irreversibility of the public good contributions or the level of uncertainty, when the latter is
given by an exogenous one-dimensional Brownian motion. This interesting conclusion shelds
new light on the old economic problem of public good contribution showing that irreversibility
and uncertainty not necessarily mitigate the degree of free riding.
A Some Proofs and Technical Results
A.1 On the Proof of Proposition 3.3
In this section we prove Proposition 3.3. The proof is a generalization of Theorem 3.2 in
Bank and Riedel (2001) to the case of a multivariate optimal consumption problem with both
monotone and absolutely continuous controls. Sufficiency easily follows from concavity of the
utility functions ui, i = 1, . . . , n. On the other hand, the next Lemma accomplishes the proof
of the necessity part. Necessity is proved by linearizing the original problem (3.1) around its
optimal solution (x∗, C∗), by showing that (x∗, C∗) solves the linearized problem as well and
that it satisfies some flat-off conditions as those of (3.7).
Recall the notation x :=
∑n
i=1 x
i and C :=
∑n
i=1C
i.
Lemma A.1. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold and (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw be optimal for problem (3.1)
and set
Ψ∗(t) := E
[ ∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γi uic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
∣∣∣Ft]. (A-1)
Then (x∗, C∗)
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i. solves the linear optimization problem
sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
; (A-2)
ii. satisfies
(
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))−Mψx(t)
)
xˆi(t) = 0, i = 1, . . . , n,
E
[ ∫ T
0
(
Ψ∗(t)−Mψc(t)
)
dC∗(t)
]
= 0,
(A-3)
with
M := P − ess sup sup
t∈[0,T ]
[
max
{
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγ1u1x(x
1∗(t), C∗(t))
ψx(t)
, . . .
. . . ,
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγnunx(x
n∗ (t), C∗(t))
ψx(t)
,
Ψ∗(t)
ψc(t)
}]
.
(A-4)
Proof. The proof splits into two steps.
Step 1. Let (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw be optimal for problem (3.1). For (x,C) ∈ Bw and  ∈ [0, 1],
define the admissible strategy (x, C) with x(t) := x(t) + (1 − )x∗(t) and such that C(t) =
C(t) + (1− )C∗(t). Notice that x(t) and C(t) converge to x∗(t) and C∗(t), respectively, a.s.
for t ∈ [0, T ] when  ↓ 0. Now, optimality of (x∗, C∗), concavity of ui and an application of
Fubini’s Theorem allow us to write
0 ≥ 1

[USP (x, C)− USP (x∗, C∗)]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))(x
i(t)− xi∗(t)) dt
]
(A-5)
+E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
(t), C(t))(C(t)− C∗(t)) dt
]
(A-6)
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))(x
i(t)− xi∗(t)) dt
]
+E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ(t)(dC(t)− dC∗(t))
]
,
(A-7)
where Φ(t) :=
∫ T
t e
− ∫ s0 r(u) du∑n
i=1 γ
i uic(x
i
(s), C(s)) ds. One has
lim inf
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i(t)dt
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt
]
,
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and
lim inf
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ(t)dC(t)
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC(t)
]
,
with Φ∗ := Φ0, by Fatou’s Lemma. We now claim (and we prove it later) that
lim
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i
∗(t)dt
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
∗(t)dt
]
, (A-8)
and
lim
↓0
E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ(t)dC∗(t)
]
= E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC∗(t)
]
. (A-9)
Hence from (A-5)
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t) dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≤ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
∗(t) dt
]
+ E
[ ∫ T
0
Φ∗(t)dC∗(t)
]
.
and by replacing Φ∗ with its optional projection Ψ∗ as defined in (A-1) (cf. Jacod Jacod (1979),
Theorem 1.33) it follows that (x∗, C∗) is optimal for problem (A-2) as well.
To conclude the proof we must prove (A-8) and (A-9). To prove (A-8) it suffices to show
that the family (Γ1 )∈[0, 1
2
] given by
Γ1 (t) := e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i
∗(t)
is P ⊗dt-uniformly integrable. Concavity of ui and the fact that xi(t) ≥ 12xi∗(t) a.s. for  ∈ [0, 12 ]
and every t ∈ [0, T ] lead to
Γ1 (t) ≤ 2e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
(t), C(t))x
i
(t) ≤ 2e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiui(xi(t), C(t)). (A-10)
The last term in the right-hand side of (A-10) is P ⊗ dt-uniformly integrable by Assumption
1.iii. Then (A-8) holds by Vitali’s Convergence Theorem.
As for (A-9) note that by Fubini’s Theorem∫ T
0
Φ(t)dC∗(t) =
∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
(t), C(t))C∗(t)dt.
Hence, to have (A-9) it suffices to show that the family
Γ2 (t) := e
− ∫ t0 r(s) ds n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
(t), C(t))C∗(t)
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is P ⊗ dt-uniformly integrable, but this follows by employing arguments similar to those used
for (Γ1 )∈[0, 1
2
].
Step 2. We now show that the flat-off conditions (A-3) hold for any solution (xˆ, Cˆ) of the
linear problem (A-2). Then, by Step 1, they also hold for (x∗, C∗).
Notice that for every (x,C) ∈ Bw one has
E
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≤ME
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dC(t)
]
= Mw (A-11)
by definition of M (cf. (A-4)). Obviously, if (x,C) satisfies (A-3) we then have equality in
(A-11). On the other hand, if
sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
= Mw, (A-12)
then equality holds through (A-11) and we obtain (A-3).
It therefore remains to prove (A-12). To this end take K < M and define the stopping times τ
i
K := inf{t ∈ [0, T ) : e−
∫ t
0 r(s)dsγiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t)) ≤ Kψx(t)} ∧ T, i = 1, . . . , n,
σK := inf{t ∈ [0, T ) : Ψ∗(t) > Kψc(t)} ∧ T,
together with the investment strategies
xiK(t) := α1[0,τ iK ]
(t), CK(t) := α1[σK ,T ](t),
for some α such that E[
∫ T
0
∑n
i=1 ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0 ψc(t)dCK(t)] = w. We then have
Mw ≥ sup
(x,C)∈Bw
E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dC(t)
]
≥ E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0
Ψ∗(t)dCK(t)
]
≥ KE
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+ αψc(σK)1{σK<T}
]
≥ KE
[ ∫ T
0
n∑
i=1
ψx(t)x
i
K(t)dt+
∫ T
0
ψc(t)dCK(t)
]
= Kw,
which yields (A-12) by letting K ↑M .
We are now able to prove Proposition 3.3.
Proof of Proposition 3.3
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Proof. Sufficiency follows from concavity of utility function ui, i = 1, . . . , n, (cf. Assumption 1).
Indeed, for (x∗, C∗) ∈ Bw satisfying (3.7) and for (x,C) any other admissible policy we may
write
USP (x∗, C∗)− USP (x,C) ≥E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(x
i
∗(t)− xi(t))dt
]
+E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(C∗(t)− C(t))dt
]
=E
[ ∫ T
0
e−
∫ t
0 r(s)ds
n∑
i=1
γiuix(x
i
∗(t), C∗(t))(x
i
∗(t)− xi(t))dt
]
+E
[ ∫ T
0
(∫ T
t
e−
∫ s
0 r(u) du
n∑
i=1
γiuic(x
i
∗(s), C∗(s)) ds
)
(dC∗(t)− dC(t))
]
≥λ(w − w) = 0,
where (3.7) and Fubini’s Theorem lead to the second inequality, whereas the last one is implied
by the first and the fourth of (3.7) and by the budget constraint. Finally, Lemma A.1 yields the
proof of the necessary part.
A.2 Proposition A.2
Proposition A.2. Let Assumptions 1 and 2 hold, and define for every i = 1, . . . , n gi(·, c) as
the inverse of uix(·, c), as well as hi(ψ, c) := uic(g(ψ, c), c) for any ψ, c > 0. Then there exists an
optional process l∗ which solves the backward stochastic equation
E
[ ∫ T
τ
e−
∫ t
0 r(s) ds
n∑
i=1
γihi
( λ
γi
e
∫ t
0 r(u)duψx(t), sup
τ≤u≤t
l∗(u)
)
dt
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λψc(τ)1{τ<T} (A-13)
for any τ ∈ T . Moreover, l∗ has upper right-continuous sample paths and then it is unique up
to indistinguishability.
Proof. Recall that the mapping c 7→ hi(ψ, c) is the composition of c 7→ gi(ψ, c) and c 7→ uic(x, c),
and hence it is continuous, strictly decreasing and satisfies the Inada conditions
lim
c↓0
hi(ψ, c) = +∞, lim
c↑∞
hi(ψ, c) = 0. (A-14)
These properties are inherited by the function
∑n
i=1 γ
ihi(ψ, ·), being γi > 0, i = 1, . . . , n.
Moreover, for any given λ > 0 the process λψc(t)1{t<T} vanishes at T , it is of class (D) and
lower semicontinuous in expectation, by Assumption 2. Thanks to Inada conditions (A-14),
we can suitably apply Theorem 3 of Bank and El Karoui (2004), as in the example in Section
3.1 therein, to have existence of an optional signal process l∗ solving (A-13). Then, adopting
arguments as those in the proof of Theorem 1 in Bank and Ku¨chler (2007) one can show that
such l∗ is upper right-continuous and therefore it is unique up to indistinguishability by Bank
and El Karoui (2004), Theorem 1, and Meyer’s optional section theorem (see, e.g., Dellacherie
and Meyer (1978), Theorem IV.86).
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A.3 Proof of Proposition 5.3
Due to Theorem 4.4, to find the Nash equilibrium strategy of the public good contribution game
(4.1) in our homogeneous and symmetric setting it suffices to solve backward equation (4.5).
Recall that hi(ψ, c) := uic(g
i(ψ, c), c) with gi(·, c) the inverse of uix(·, c). For any λi > 0,
straightforward computations lead to hi(λiertψx(t), C(t)) = δ(λ
iEx(t))
α
α−1C
α+β−1
1−α (t), with δ :=
β
α
(
α+β
α
) 1
α−1
. Set Ci∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t `∗(s)∨0 for some progressively measurable process `∗ solving
E
[ ∫ ∞
τ
δe−rs(λiEx(s))
α
α−1
(
n sup
τ≤u≤s
`∗(u)
)α+β−1
1−α
ds
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λie−rτEc(τ),
i.e.,
E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru(λi)
α
α−1
Ex
α
α−1 (u+ τ)
Ec(τ) inf0≤s≤u
(
n`∗
α+β−1
1−α (s+ τ)
)
du
∣∣∣∣Fτ] = λi. (A-15)
Now take `∗(t) := κnEc
1−α
α+β−1 (t)Ex
α
α+β−1 (t) for some constant κ and use independence and sta-
tionarity of Le´vy increments to rewrite (A-15) as
κ
α+β−1
1−α E
[ ∫ ∞
0
δe−ru inf
0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E
α
α−1
x (u− s)
)
du
]
= (λi)
1
1−α . (A-16)
By defining A := E[
∫∞
0 δe
−ru inf0≤s≤u
(
Ec(s)E−
α
1−α
x (u− s)
)
du] (cf. (5.13)), and by solving
(A-16) for λi one obtains
λi := A1−ακα+β−1.
But now xi∗(t) = [λi
(
α+β
α
)
Ex(t)C−β∗ (t)]
1
α−1 , and therefore
xi∗(t) = (λ
i)−
1
1−α
[(
α+ β
α
)
Ex(t)κ−β inf
0≤s≤t
(
E
β(1−α)
1−α−β
c (s)E
αβ
1−α−β
x (s)
)]− 1
1−α
;
that is,
xi∗(t) = κγ(t) (A-17)
with γ(t) as in (5.10).
To determine κ we use the budget constraint E[
∫∞
0 ψx(t)x
i∗(t)dt +
∫∞
0 ψc(t)dC
i∗(t)] = w.
Indeed, by (A-17) we have
κE
[ ∫ ∞
0
ψx(t)γ(t)dt+
1
n
∫ ∞
0
ψc(t)dθ(t)
]
= w, (A-18)
since Ci∗(t) = sup0≤s≤t `∗(s) =
κ
n sup0≤s≤t(E
− 1−α
1−α−β
c (s)E
− α
1−α−β
x (s)) = κθ(t) with θ(t) as in (5.11).
Now the result follows by solving (A-18) for κ.
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